Шпионы XX века (Главы 11-15)
Шрифт:
(21) David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 209.
(22) Kerby in interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967.
(23) M. R. D. Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', in W. Laquer (ed.). The Second World War (London and Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage 1982), p. 251.
(24) See Werner Rings, Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) for examples.
(25) David Stafford, 'The Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance after the Fall of France', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 10(1975), pp. 215 and 196 respectively.
(26) See, for example, R. Crossman and K. Martin, 100,000,000 Allies If We Choose. pamphlet, July 1940.
(27) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 247.
(28) Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (London: Cape, 1983), p. 37.
(29) Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (London and New York: Deutsch and Basic Books, 1983), p. 85.
(30) Milovan Djilas quoted in Stafford's book Britain and European Resistance, p. 210.
(31) Richard Usborne, quoted in Mark Wheeler, 'The SOE Phenomenon', in Laquer, Second World War, p. 195.
(32) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', p. 243.
(33) PRO, 32/1061 l/MA/08233, Home Defence Security Executive, 20 March 1941.
(34) Respectively: interview with Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1967; and quoted in Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 350.
(35) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has investigated the German story without any conclusive result.
(36) Jean Overton Fuller, The German Penetration of SOE (London: Kimber, 1975), pp. 175-6.
(37) William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: the Secret War 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 457.
(38) Foot, 'Was SOE any Good?', pp. 248-9.
(39) Louis de Jong, 'The Great Game" of Secret Agents', Encounter, January 1980, pp. 12-21; and West, M16, p. 180.
(40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 137.
(41) ibid., p. 142.
(42) Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 75
[444]
(43) Basil Davidson, 'Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War', New Statesman, 4 JULY 1980, p. 11.
(44) Private letter to Peter Calvocoressi.
(45) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 180.
(46) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 24.
Глава 7
(1) There are many versions of these events. The best is to be found in Callum A. MacDonald, 'The Venio Affair', European Studies Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (October 1978), pp. 443-64.
(2) David Astor, 'Why the Revolt against Hitler was Ignored', Encounter, June 1969, p. 7.
(3) Telegram from D. G. Osborne (The Vatican) to London, 1 December 1939, in 'Papst Pius XII, die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition in Winter 1939/40', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22, no. 3 (1974).
(4) Astor, 'Revolt against Hitler', p. 8.
(5) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 445.
(6) West, M16, p. 71.
(7) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 448.
(8) Christie Papers, CHRS 1/27-8, Churchill College, Cambridge.
(9) W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Deutsch, 1956), p. 106.
(10) S. Payne Best, The Venio Incident (London: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 7.
(11) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 459.
(12) PRO, FO/371/C./7324/89/15, Churchill directive, 28 June 1940.
(13) C. Simpson and P. Knightley, 'The Secret List of Rudolph Hess', Sunday Times, 7 November 1982.
(14) Churchill's secretary. Sir John Colville, in interview with Colin Simpson and author, November 1982.
(15) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 100.
(16) West, M16, p. 112.
(17) ibid., pp. 186-7.
(18) ibid., p. 110.
(19) ibid., pp. 152-3.
(20) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 367.
(21) West, M16, pp. 84, 225.
(22) ibid., p. 44.
(23) ibid., pp. 50-2, 74.
(24) Louis de Jong, 'Britain and Dutch Resistance, 1940^ 1945', p. 21. Notifies voor het Geschied werk, no. 109 (undated), Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation.
(25) See Hans L. Trefousse, 'The Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1939-1945', Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 42, no. 1 (June 1955).
(26) Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, British Troops, Austria. Liddell Hart Collection, 9/24/229, University of London, King's College Centre for Military Archives.
(27) West, M16, pp. 173, 184.
(28) ibid., pp. 200-1.
(29) Trefousse, 'Failure of German Intelligence', p. 100.
(30) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
(31) The correspondence between Liddell and Johnson, and Johnson and the State Department is in the National Archives, Washington under: US Embassy, London, 1940-1941, RG 84, Box 4/820/02/C/1940.
(32) Farago, Foxes, pp. 472-3.
(33) The Times, 6 September 1944.
(34) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 30-1.
(35) David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East (London: Kimber, 198G), p. 190.
(36) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 58.
(37) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 165.
(38) ibid., p. 37.
(39) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1978.
(40) Dusko Popov, Spy/Counter Spy (London: Panther, 1976), p. 223.
(41) 'German Naval Intelligence, Part B: Naval Intelligence and the Normandy Invasion', 15 October 1946, p. 44, US National Archives, Washington DC.