ГУЛаг Палестины
Шрифт:
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at pp. 994-95. See also Ross v. Kent Inst. (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 79, at pp. 85-88 (B.C.C.A.), in which that court held
that it is not essential in order to comply with principles of fundamental justice that an inmate know the sources of information before the
Parole Board as long as he is informed of the substance of that information.
The CSIS Act and Review Committee Rules recognize the competing individual and state interests and attempt to find a reasonable
balance between them. The Rules expressly direct that the Committee's discretion be exercised with regard to this balancing of
interests.
In this case the respondent was first provided with the "Statement of Circumstances giving rise to the making of a Report by the
Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Employment and Immigration to the Security Intelligence Review Committee". This
document set out the nature of the information received by the Review Committee from the Ministers, including that the respondent had
been involved in drug trafficking, and was involved in the murder of a named individual. Also prior to the Review Committee hearing,
the respondent was provided with an extensive summary of surveillance of his activities (the "Chronology of Information") and a
"Summary of Interpretation of Intercepted Private Communications relating to the murder of Domenic Racco". Although the first day of
the hearing was conducted in camera, the respondent was provided with a summary of the evidence presented. In my view, these
various documents gave the respondent sufficient information to know the substance of the allegations against him, and to be able to
respond. It is not necessary, in order to comply with fundamental justice in this context, that the respondent also be given details of the
criminal intelligence investigation techniques or police sources used to acquire that information.
The respondent was also given the opportunity to respond, by calling his own witnesses or by requesting that he be allowed to
cross-examine the RCMP witnesses who testified in camera. The Chairman of the Review Committee clearly indicated an intention to
allow such cross-examination:
Certainly, it would be my inclination that if the RCMP wish to call witnesses in support of any or all of the comments that they may
make in support of the Statement of Circumstances, there would be the opportunity for the applicant's counsel to cross-examine.
The respondent chose not to exercise these options. Having regard to the information that was disclosed to the respondent, the
procedural opportunities that were available to him, and the competing interests at play in this area, I conclude that the procedure
followed by the Review Committee in this case did not violate principles of fundamental justice.
VI. Conclusion
I would therefore allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-appeal, both with costs, and answer the constitutional questions as follows:
Main Appeal
1 (a) Do sections 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now ss. 81
and 82 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms?
Answer:Assuming without deciding that s. 7 applies, the answer is no.
(b) If the sections referred to above do infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, are they justified by s. 1 of the
Charter?
Answer:This question does not have to be answered.
2 (a) Does reliance upon the certificate authorized by s. 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by
S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now s. 82 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) filed in the respondent's case result in an infringement of
his rights pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter, because the process followed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee did not meet the
requirements of s. 7?
Answer: Assuming without deciding that s. 7 applies, the answer is no.
(b) If reliance upon the certificate does infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, is it justified by s. 1 of the Charter?
Answer:This question does not have to be answered.
Cross-Appeal
1 (a) Do s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and s. 32(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as amended by S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 84 (now
s. 27(1)(d)(ii) and s. 32(2) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2) infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that they require the deportation of persons convicted of an offence carrying a maximum
punishment of five years or more, without reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender?
Answer:With respect to s. 15, the answer is no. Assuming, without deciding, that either s. 7 or s. 12 apply, the answer is no.
(b) If the paragraph and subsection referred to above do infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the Charter, are
they justified by s. 1 of the Charter?
Answer:This question does not have to be answered.
Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed. With respect to the main appeal, assuming without deciding that s. 7 is applicable,